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Mark Sveen and Kaye Melin fell in love in the 1990’s and in 1997 the couple married.1  One 
year later, Mr. Sveen purchased a life insurance policy naming his wife as the primary beneficiary.2  
In 2002, Minnesota, where the Sveen’s resided, enacted statute 524.2-804 requiring the default 
revocation of previous spouses named as beneficiaries after divorces except in certain 
circumstances.3  Unfortunately, the Sveen’s marriage did not last and in 2007 the couple divorced 
without any mention of the life insurance policy.4  Mr. Sveen passed away just four years later 
having not altered his life insurance policy and creating a mystery of who he intended the Life 
insurance policy to benefit.5   
A federal district court ruled that the statute required Mr. Sveen’s life insurance policy payout 
be paid to the contingent beneficiaries, his two children.6  The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Eighth Circuit, reversed and remanded the district court decision, holding that the statute was 
unconstitutional when applied retroactively because it violated the Contract Clause of the United 
States Constitution.7  The Supreme Court issued a Writ of Certiorari in the case and reversed the 
decision of the Court of Appeals, holding that the statute’s retroactive applicability does not violate 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2020, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., Rutgers University.  I would like to extend a 
special thank you to my Clare for all of the love and support she gave me during this process and to Professor Healy 
for his essential guidance in this process.  
1 Sveen v. Melin, 138 S.Ct. 1815, 1821 (2018). 
2 Melin, 138 S.Ct. at 1821. 
3 Id. at 1820; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 524.2-804 (“[T]he dissolution or annulment of a marriage revokes any revocable . . . 
disposition, beneficiary designation, or appointment of property made by an individual to the individual’s former 
spouse in a governing instrument.”). 
4 Sveen v. Melin, 138 S. Ct. 1815, 1821 (2018). 
5 Melin, 138 S.Ct. at 1821. 
6 Id. 




the Contract Clause of the Constitution because it did not substantially impair the insurance 
contract.8  Justice Neil Gorsuch filed a lone dissent in the case.9  The Court’s holding in Sveen was 
just the newest installment of a two century-long debate on the proper interpretation of the Contract 
Clause. 
This Comment will examine the Supreme Court’s long history of interpreting and applying the 
Contract Clause of the Constitution in Part II; the interpretation of the Contract Clause used by the 
Court in Sveen to reach its holding in Part III; the alternative interpretation of the Contract Clause 
applied by Justice Gorsuch in his dissent in Part IV; the problems inherent in the Court’s 
interpretation of the Contract Clause in Part V;  propose a new interpretation of the Contract Clause 
that is more aligned with its original purpose and intent in Part VI;  examine the arguments against 
the proposed interpretation in Part VII; and, will hypothesize how Sveen would have turned out 
differently under the proposed interpretation in Part VIII.   
II. Contract Clause Jurisprudence, From the Framers to the Present 
 
A. The Early History of the Contract Clause 
 
While the Contract Clause of the Constitution is only eleven words in total length, hundreds 
of thousands of words have been written interpreting it.10  The Contract Clause is found in Article 
I, Section 10, Clause 1, which in its entirety states, “[n]o State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, 
or confederation; grant letters of marque and reprisal; coin money; emit bills of credit; make 
anything but gold and silver a legal tender in payment of debts; pass any bill of attainder, ex-post-
facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts; or grant any title of nobility.”11  The 
 
8 Sveen v. Melin, 138 S.Ct. 1815, 1826 (2018). 
9 Melin, 138 S.Ct. at 1827 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 





Contract Clause itself only refers to the prohibition against states passing laws that impair “the 
obligation of contracts.”12   
The Contract Clause was introduced at the Constitutional Convention by Rufus King and was 
molded after an Ordinance in the Articles of Confederation.13  When it was introduced, the clause 
was not loved by all.14  Multiple objections over its inclusion were made during the ratifying 
process.15  The history of the debate over the Contract Clause gives insight into what the original 
purpose of the Clause was.16  The Contract Clause was intended to protect contracts from 
protectionist legislation passed by states.17  Its purpose was also to protect minorities from 
majority’s laws, as well as to promote stability.18  One objection made at the time of the ratification 
was that the Contract Clause prevented states from responding with necessary regulations in times 
of emergency.19  Even James Madison, who supported the Contract Clause’s inclusion, admitted 
that it could act as an inconvenience for the states, but felt the clause was necessary.20   
While there is some dispute over the exact purpose of the Contract Clause, many scholars 
reference Federalist Paper 44 for guidance.21  Written by Madison, the paper argued that,  
The sober people of America are weary of the fluctuating policy which has directed 
the public councils.  They have seen with regret and indignation that sudden 
 
12 Id.  
13 See Douglas W. Kmiec & John O. McGinnis, The Contract Clause: A Return to the Original Understanding, 14 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 525, 529–30 (1987) [hereinafter Original Understanding] (citing to the Ordinance for the 
Government of the Territory of the United States North-West of the River Ohio, 1 Stat. 51 (1789)). 
14 Id. at 530.  
15 Id. at 531.  
16 Id. at 532–33.  
17 Id.  
18 See Original Understandings, supra note 13, at 528–29. 
19 Id. at 533 (Martin Luther complained the Contract Clause would limit the abilities of states to pass legislation during 
emergencies.).  
20 Id. at 530.  
21 See J. Michael Veron, The Contract Clause and the Court: A View of Precedent and Practice in Constitutional 
Adjudication, 54 TUL. L. REV. 117, 122–23 (1979) [hereinafter, Contract Clause and the Court] (arguing that there is 
some doubt about the origin of the Contract Clause and referencing Federalist No. 44 as guidance on the purpose of 
the Contract Clause); see also Tommy Tobin, Far From A” Dead Letter”: The Contract Clause and North Carolina 
Association of Educators v. State, 96 N.C.L. REV. 1681, 1682 [hereinafter, Far from a “Dead Letter”] (arguing that 




changes and legislative interferences, in cases affecting personal rights, become 
jobs in the hands of enterprising and influential speculators, and snares to the more-
industrious and less informed part of the community.22   
 
The paper demonstrated that contracts were understood to be important at the time the Constitution 
was ratified and supports the argument that the goal of the Contract Clause was to protect contracts 
from “sudden changes and legislative interferences” especially in cases “affecting personal 
rights”.23  The early jurisprudence of the Contract Clause aligned with this understanding of the 
purpose of the Contract Clause.24  
In 1810, the Supreme Court heard Fletcher v. Peck, a Contract Clause challenge to the repeal 
of a law selling land in the State of Georgia.25  The crux of the case was that Georgia repealed a 
law under which land rights were sold to citizens.26  One of the questions before the Court was 
could the State absolve itself of the contracts it had entered into to distribute the land under the 
law.27  The Court held that the repealing of the law violated the Constitution.28  The Court, without 
mention of the Contract Clause, held the law impaired the land-granting contracts.29  
This all-inclusive and broad interpretation of the Contract Clause was reaffirmed in the 1819 
matter of Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward.30  The case involved the corporate charter 
of Dartmouth College and a New Hampshire law that attempted to alter the charter to make the 
college a public university.31  The Court held the New Hampshire law was an impairment to the 
 
22 THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 (James Madison); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaidell, 290 U.S. 398, 463 (Sutherland, 
J. dissenting) (1934). 
23 Id.  
24 See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 88 (1810); Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 663 (1819); 
Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122 (1819); Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. 1 (1823).  
25 10 U.S. 87, 127 (1810). 
26 Id. at 129.  
27 Id. at 130.  
28 Id. at 132. 
29 Id. at 132, 139 (the Court also compared to the impairment to a violation of ex-post-facto law, which is prohibited 
by the Constitution in the same clause as the Contract Clause); See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
30 17 U.S. 518 (1819). 




charter and was therefore unconstitutional.32  In the Court’s holding, Justice Marshall opined, 
“[a]nd can it be seriously contended, that a law, which changes so materially the terms of a 
contract, does not impair it?  In short, does not every alteration of a contract, however, 
unimportant, even though it be manifestly for the interest of the party objecting to it, impair its 
obligation?”33   
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Contract Clause in Woodward was reaffirmed twice 
before it was amended by the Court.34  In Sturges v. Crowninshield, a bankruptcy law was held 
unconstitutional when applied retroactively.35  In Green v. Biddle, the Supreme Court held that “a 
State has no more power to impair an obligation into which she has entered” and struck down a 
Kentucky law that altered a contract between the states of Kentucky and Virginia.36   
After Green, the next time the Supreme Court heard a Contract Clause dispute was in Ogden 
v. Saunders, which presented a challenge to New York’s bankruptcy law.37  The Court held that 
the Contract Clause only prevented states from passing laws that retroactively impaired 
contracts.38  The Court supported its holding by arguing that the Contract Clause must be 
interpreted in the same fashion as the other prohibitions found in Article 1, Section 10, Clause 1 
of the Constitution.39  In conclusion of it holding, the Court stated “the prohibition, in the tenth 
section, reaches to all contracts.”40  The Court’s holding in Saunders marked the beginning of a 
 
32 Id. at 650. 
33 Id. at 662. 
34 Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. 1 (1823). 
35 Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122, 123, 131 (1819). 
36 Crowninshield, 17 U.S. at 92–93. 
37 25 U.S. 213, 254 (1827). 
38 Saunders, 25 U.S. at 252; see Contract Clause and the Court, supra note 21, at 126.  
39 Id.; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. (Prohibits states from paying their debts with anything other than silver or gold 
or coining their own money). 




downhill spiral for the Contract Clause by limiting the Contract Clause to a ban against retroactive 
state legislation that impaired contracts.41  
Considered together, the Court’s holdings in Fletcher, Woodward, Sturges, Green and 
Saunders laid out a clear and definitive interpretation of the Contract Clause—an interpretation 
that acted as a bar against any state law that sought to retroactively impair contracts between any 
parties, for any reason, and that did not distinguish between private and public contracts.42  This 
complete bar has never been seen again in Contract Clause jurisprudence.43   
B. The First Decline of the Contract Clause 
 
Post Saunders, the Supreme Court began weakening the Contract Clause.44  In 1870, in the 
case of Jackson ex dem. Hart v. Lamphire, the Supreme Court held that retroactive recording laws 
did not violate the Contract Clause.45  Additionally, the Court held “Cases may occur where the 
provisions [of a law] . . . may be so unreasonable as to amount to a denial of a right” of the contract 
but that was not the case in the matter before it.46  Compared to Court’s holding Saunders, the 
Court’s holding in Lamphire interpreted the Contract Clause to be less absolute.47 
In the 1871 case of Curtis v. Whitney, the Supreme Court upheld a retroactive state law that 
required the holder of a certificate of tax-sale to notify anyone in possession of the land listed on 
the tax-sale certificate.48  The Court relied on its previous holding in Jackson to support its holding 
 
41 See Contract Clause and the Court, supra note 21, at 126; Leo Clarke, The Contract Clause: A Basis For Limited 
Judicial Review of State Economic Regulation, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 183, 190 (1985) [hereinafter, Limited Judicial 
Review].  
42See Contract Clause and the Court, supra note 21, at 127; see also Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87 (1810); Trustees of 
Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819); Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122 (1819); Green v. Biddle, 
21 U.S. 1 (1823); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213 (1827). 
43 See Original Understanding, supra note 13, at 527.  
44 See Limited Judicial Review, supra note 41, at 190 (describing how starting in 1842, the Contract Clause began 
being weakened by the Court). 
45 28 U.S. 280, 290 (1830). 
46 Lamphire, 28 U.S. at 290.  
47 Compare Jackson ex dem. Hart v. Lamphire, 28 U.S. 280 (1830) (where the Court upheld a state recording law) 
with Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213 (1827) (where the Court struck down a state bankruptcy law). 




in Curtis.49  Notably, the Curtis Court held that “[n]or does every statute which affects the value 
of a contract impair its obligation.”50  The Court concluded that only state laws which impaired 
the “obligation of performance” were restrained by the Constitution.51   
Stone v. Mississippi was the next major Contract Clause case that made its way to the Supreme 
Court.52  The case was a challenge to a Mississippi law that repealed a contract, in which the state 
was a party, allowing a state lottery.53  The Court’s holding in Stone stands out because it 
distinguished between public and private contracts.54  The Court held that the Contract Clause only 
protected “property rights, not governmental” rights because the Court thought it was foreseeable 
by those who chartered lottery corporations with the state that the state retained the ability to 
legislate the lottery out of existence at any time.55  The consideration of the Court about the 
foreseeability of government action in the field in which the contract exist is a theme that continues 
in Contract Clause jurisprudence.56  
In Vance v. Vance, the Supreme Court examined a Louisiana mortgage recording statute to 
determine if it violated the Contract Clause.57  The Court upheld the law and reaffirmed its previous 
holdings in Curtis and Jackson.58  The Court held the recording statute acted similarly to statutes 
of limitations.59  The Court also held that both recording statutes and statutes of limitations were 
necessary to manage land rights and that the laws did not impair the rights of contracts as they did 
 
49 Whitney, 80 U.S. at 71. 
50 Id. at 70.    
51 Id. at 71. 
52 101 U.S. 814 (1879).  
53 Stone, 101 U.S. at 816. 
54 Id.  
55 Id. at 820.  
56 Id.; see Sveen v. Melin, 138 S.Ct. 1815, 1822 (2018) (the Court considered the fact a Court could have altered the 
life insurance policy when the Sveen’s divorced as evidence the contract was not impaired). 
57 108 U.S. 514, 516 (1883).  
58 Vance, 108 U.S. at 518, 520, 522.  




not “change, defeat, or impair the obligation” of contracts.60  The comparison of recording statutes 
to statutes of limitations laws is an often repeated concept in Contract Clause jurisprudence.61  It 
is similar to viewing state laws as default rules that act on, but do not impair contracts—a view 
analyzed in the Court’s holding in Sveen.62   
Not long after the Court’s holding in Vance, the Court heard the matter of Gilfillan v. Union 
Canal Co. of Pennsylvania.63  In Gilfillan, the Court upheld a retroactive state law because the 
impairment the law caused was held to be reasonable.64  The Court cited to Vance for the 
proposition that the Court should examine the ease of compliance with the law as evidence of why 
the law should stand.65  Balancing the reasonableness of the impairment to the contract and the 
ease of compliance with the law continue to be elements of Contract Clause jurisprudence today.66 
Seibert v. Lewis was the next major Contract Clause case to reach the Supreme Court and 
demonstrated that the clause was not yet worthless.67  The Court in Seibert held that the Missouri 
law impaired what it viewed as the most important portion of a contract—the ability to enforce it 
—and was therefore unconstitutional.68  The holding in Seibert was important because it 
recognized that impairment of contracts was still a concern for the Court and that Contract Clause 
challenges were still worth bring.69 
Similarly, in McGahey v. Commonwealth of Virginia, the Court demonstrated that the Contract 
Clause was not completely dead letter law.70  The Court held in McGahey that a retroactive 
 
60 Id. at 517.  
61 Sveen v. Melin, 138 S.Ct. 1815, 1823–24 (2018). 
62 Id. 
63 109 U.S. 401 (1883). 
64 Gilfillan, 109 U.S. at 406–07. 
65 Id. at 407.  
66 See Sveen v. Melin, 138 S.Ct. 1815, 1817–18 (2018). 
67 122 U.S. 284 (1887). 
68 Lewis, 122 U.S. at 297, 300. 
69 Id. at 300. 




Virginia law that burdened the redemption of bonds was unconstitutional.71  The Court stated that 
“[i]t is well settled by the adjudications of this court that the obligation of a contract is impaired, 
in the sense of the constitution, by any act which prevents its enforcement, or which materially 
abridges the remedy for enforcing it”.72 
C. Rock Bottom for the Contract Clause 
 
The entire application of the Contract Clause changed with the Court’s holding in Home 
Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell in 1934.73  A Minnesota mortgage moratorium law was 
challenged for violating the Contract Clause because the law allowed courts to prolong the time a 
borrower had to recover when behind on their mortgage.74  It must be noted that this law was 
passed in the heart of the Great Depression.75  The Court’s holding in Blaisdell set forth a test to 
determine what level of impairment a state law can constitutionally create.76  The creation of the 
test itself demonstrated how weakened the Contract Clause had become.  The Contract Clause that 
had once held that any impairment of a contract was unconstitutional, now had a test to determine 
the amount of impairment that was permissible.77  The Court’s holding made clear it was no longer 
bound by the original understanding of the Contract Clause.78  
The test set forth in the Court’s holding considered five factors: (1) was the law passed in 
pursuit of a reasonable end and written reasonably to accomplish that end, noting that a reasonable 
 
71 Id. at 684.  
72 Id. at 693. 
73 290 U.S. 398 (1934); see Original Understanding, supra note 13 at 541–42; see Dead Letter, supra note 21, at 
1686–87. 
74 Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 415–16 (1934). 
75 Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 419.  
76 Id. at 444–48. 
77 Compare Home Building & Loan Assoc. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (Where the Court utilized a five factor 
test to determine how much impairment was constitutional) with Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 88 (1810) (Where the 
Court held any impairment was unconstitutional). 
78 Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaidell, 290 U.S. 398, 439 (1934) (“It cannot be maintained that the constitutional 





end cannot be to advantage certain individuals; (2) was the law passed in response to an 
emergency; (3) was the law an appropriate response to the emergency; (4) are the impairments 
created by the law reasonable in comparison to the emergency the law was drafted to address; and, 
(5) was the law temporary in nature or was the law meant to exist even after the emergency 
subsided.79  While this five-factor test is no longer the standard applied to state laws challenged 
under the Contract Clause, it is still often cited and referenced as leading to the current standard.80   
It should be noted that the Court’s holding in Blaisdell had a dissent, written by Justice 
Sutherland, which took issue with the majority’s ignoring of the original meaning of the Contract 
Clause.81  In the dissent, the justice made clear that considering public and private contracts 
differently was a disturbing development and one that violated both the original intent of the 
Contract Clause and the Contract Clause jurisprudence of the Court.82  These are complaints that 
are levied at the Court today for its modern jurisprudence involving the Contract Clause.83  
In City of El Paso v. Simmons, a 1965 Supreme Court Contract Clause challenge, the Court 
referenced but did not wholly rely on the Court’s earlier holding in Blaisdell.84  In Simmons, the 
Court held that a Texas law that retroactively placed a five-year statute of limitation on challenges 
to land foreclosures by the state, on property sold by the state, was constitutional.85  The Court 
held, in line with its earlier decisions, that not all modifications of contracts, nor alterations of 
possible remedies, constituted unconstitutional impairment.86  The Court’s holding in Simmons 
 
79 Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 444–48.  
80 See United States Tr. Co. of New York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977); see also Allied Structural Steel Co. v. 
Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978). 
81 Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaidell, 290 U.S. 398, 448–50 (Sutherland, J. dissenting) (1934). 
82 Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 454 (Sutherland, J. dissenting). 
83 Sveen v. Melin, 138 S.Ct. 1815, 1827 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (2018).  
84 379 U.S. 497, 508 (1965). 
85 Simmons, 379 U.S. at 497–500, 517. 




exemplified the weakening of the Contract Clause to its most powerless form.87  The holding 
showed that a state could retroactively change the terms of a contract, to which it was a party, in a 
manner that led to the complete loss of property by the other party of the contract, without the law 
running afoul of the Contract Clause.88   
Justice Black wrote a dissent in Simmons that is often quoted by advocates for a return to the 
original interpretation of the Contract Clause.89  In the dissent, the justice criticized what he defined 
as the Court “balancing away the plain guarantee” of the Contract Clause.90  Justice Black was 
critical of the rationale of the Majority, which he accused of setting the precedent that contracts 
can be impaired by the states whenever it is financially advisable.91  He also took issue with the 
Court “balancing” its way into upholding a law that it openly admitted was an impairment of 
contracts.92  Justice Black cited to The Federalist Number 44, the Court’s holding in both Fletcher 
and Sturges, and early Contract Clause jurisprudence as evidence that while remedies may be 
altered by a state, the obligations of a contract never can be.93  Justice Black accused the majority 
of having made up new law without the support of precedent and of having overruled the Court’s 
Contract Clause precedent without acknowledging they did so.94  
The dissent also disagreed with the Court’s interpretation of Blaisdell.95  Justice Black argued 
that Blaisdell was limited to laws that retroactively impair contracts during times of urgent need.96  
Lastly, the dissent took issue with the idea of a “reasonableness formula” which the justice defined 
 
87 Compare City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965) with Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 88 (1810). 
88 Sveen v. Melin, 138 S.Ct. 1815, 1828 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (2018). 
89 City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 517 (Black, J. dissenting) (1965).  
90 Simmons, 379 U.S. at 517 (Black, J. dissenting).  
91 Id. at 518.  
92 Id. at 520.  
93 Id. at 522.  
94 Id. at 523, 531–32 (“I do not believe that any or all of the things set out above on which the Court relies are . . . 
required by the Contract Clause.”).  
95 Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 523 (Black, J. dissenting) (“The cases the Court mentions do not supports its reasoning.”). 




as a test of “indefinable standards”.97  Justice Black quibbled with the concept that the Court should 
attempt to define the “primary consideration” of why a buyer entered into a contract.98  While 
Justice Black was alone in his dissent, his powerful argument fuels many critics of the modern 
jurisprudence of the Contract Clause.99 
D. The Contract Clause Returns from the Grave 
 
In 1977, the Supreme Court heard a challenge to the revocation of a bond agreement between 
the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey in the case of United States Trust Company of 
New York v.  New Jersey.100  The Court began by addressing the history of the Contract Clause, 
pointing out that the Contract Clause was originally a very strong check on state powers but had 
been weakened over time and become less frequently used after the passing of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.101  The Court then addressed what it described as the two controlling cases of 
Contract Clause jurisprudence, Blaisdell and Simmons.102  The Court pointed out that both holdings 
set a very high bar for invalidating a state law.103  The Court held that while it may not “comport[] 
with current views of wise public policy, the Contract Clause remains a part of our written 
Constitution.”104  The Court’s holding was filled with dicta that can best be described as a battle 
to balance the Contract Clause having some significant meaning and the Court’s jurisprudence on 
the clause which deprived the clause of almost all significance.105 
 
97 Id.  
98 Id.  
99 See Sveen v. Melin, 138 S.Ct. 1821, 1828 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (2018). 
100 431 U.S. 1, 1–14 (1977). 
101 Id. at 15.  
102 Id. at 15–16. 
103 Id. at 16.  
104 Id.  
105 Id. at 27  (The Court referenced its holdings in Fletcher and Dartmouth College, both early 19th century cases that 
held the Contract Clause was a complete bar on state laws involving contracts.  The Court then immediately stated 
that the State must have the ability to pass and remove laws that could involve contracts. The contradiction of the 




The Court began its analysis by analyzing if there was impairment of contract when the Port 
Authority Bonds were revoked.106  The Court heavily relied on the finding of the district court, 
that the bond values were negatively affected by the State’s action, and held that there was 
impairment of the contracts.107  The Court then, in line with its jurisprudence of the Contract 
Clause, did not automatically strike down the law but evaluated the impairment to determine if it 
was permissible.108   
The Court held that impairment is permissible if it is “reasonable and necessary to serve an 
important public purpose.”109  The Court noted that this was the standard for both public and 
private contracts but that when evaluating impairment of private contracts the state legislative 
should be given complete deference over what is “reasonable and necessary”.110  The justification 
for the disparity in treatment given by the Court was that a “governmental entity can always find 
a use for extra money”.111   
The Court set out two prongs of consideration to determine what satisfied the “necessary” 
element.112  The two considerations the Court put forward were: (1) considering if modification of 
the contract was essential; and, (2) was there a less intrusive way to modify the contract that could 
have accomplished the same goal.113  When paired with the requirement that the purpose the law 
had to be an “important and legitimate public concern,” this standard amounted to a high bar, 
similar to strict scrutiny.114  The Court’s holding represented a major change of course from the 
 
106 U.S. Tr. Co. of New York, 431 U.S. at 17.  
107 Id. at 20. 
108 Id. (The Court reaffirmed the view put forward in Blaisdell that even though the Contract Clause plainly reads as 
a prohibition upon state laws impairing contracts, the clause is not absolute and should not be applied like a 
mathematical formula); see Home Building & Loan Assoc. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 428 (1934). 
109 U.S. Tr. Co. of New York, 431 U.S. at 25. 
110 Id. at 26. 
111 Id.  
112 Id. at 29–30. 
113 Id. 




Contract Clause jurisprudence applied by the Court in Simmons.115  The holding reaffirmed the 
belief that the Contract Clause served as some form of a check upon the states, even if it was 
limited to only laws that impaired the obligations of public contracts.116  
Less than a year later, the Court heard Allied Structural Steel Company v. Spannaus, a 
challenge to the constitutionality of a retroactive Minnesota law that changed certain terms of 
private pensions.117  The Court began its holding by stating that the Contract Clause reads 
“unambiguously absolute” and as a complete bar to any retroactive contract impairment, but that 
the jurisprudence of the Contract Clause has not held the clause to be so broad since the early 19th 
century.118  But, the Court also opined that the Contract Clause is “not a dead letter.”119 
The Court’s holding first measured the degree of impairment the law created, stating that if the 
impairment was minimal, the inquiry ended there, but if it was substantial, the law required careful 
examination.120  The Court opined that when measuring the impairment a state law created, it was 
important to factor in the “high value the Framers placed on the protection of private contracts.”121  
The Court held the Minnesota law severely impaired the contracts.122  The Court applied the 
test in United States Trust Company of New York which required the law to have been passed to 
“meet an important general social problem.”123  The Court held the Minnesota law was not passed 
to address any general social problem and therefor was evaluated in same manner as if the law 
 
115 Compare U.S. Tr. Co. of New York, 431 U.S. at 28 with El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965).    
116 U.S. Tr. Co. of New York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 16 (1977). 
117 438 U.S. 234, 236 (1978). 
118 Spannaus, 438 U.S. at 240.  
119 Id. at 241. 
120 Id. at 244.  
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 247.  




impaired a public contract with no deference was given to the legislature.124  Without deference to 
the legislature, the law was struck down as unconstitutional.125  
E. Somewhere in the Middle, Reversal of the Contract Clause Jurisprudence, Again 
 
The Contract Clause came up in a number of cases before the Supreme Court near the end of 
the 20th century.  In the 1982 case of Texaco, Inc. v. Short, the Court dismissed a challenge to a 
mining law in a single paragraph, holding that state laws passed before a contract was entered into 
were immune from Contract Clause challenges and, even if they were not, having to record a 
document in a county recording office was such a minimal burden that it was “not beyond the 
scope of permissible state action.”126 
A year later, the Court heard a similar case that involved a Kansas law which regulated private 
contracts for the sale and purchase of natural gas in the matter of Energy Reserves Group v. Kansas 
Power & Light Company.127  The Court acknowledged its holdings in Blaisdell, US Trust and 
Allied Steel, and laid out a test to determine the validity of Contract Clause challenges very similar 
to the test found in Allied Steel.128  The first step required the Court to examine the state law to 
determine if it substantially impaired the contract in question.129 
 The Court undertook the first step and held that the Kansas law did not amount to a substantial 
impairment because it did not impair the reasonable expectations of the parties to the contract.130  
The Court held the natural gas market was highly regulated and that the contract in question 
recognized that explicitly.131  Additionally, the Court held that “[t]here can be little doubt about 
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the legitimate public purpose behind the Act.”132  Lastly, the Court held that the law was reasonable 
in its pursuit of the legitimate public purpose.133  The Court’s decision to uphold the law, utilizing 
a test similar to the tests found in US Trust and Allied Steel, showed that state laws could still 
survive Constitutional challenges even under the slightly revived Contract Clause.134  
In 1983, the Court heard Exxon Corporation v. Eagerton, a Contract Clause challenge to an 
Alabama law that retroactively stopped pass-through agreements on taxes for oil and gas sold, 
even if they were explicitly agreed to as part of previously executed sales contracts.135  The Court’s 
holding began with recited dicta from its holdings in both Stone and Blaisdell that laws “even 
barring altogether, the performance of duties created by contracts” could be constitutional.136  The 
Court held that the purpose of the Alabama law was to lower the cost of oil and gas for all 
consumers and that the law was to be expected given previous rulings of the Court involving oil 
and gas laws.137  The Court concluded the Alabama law did not violate the Constitution.138  
Notably, the Court did not present an argument that, or even conclusively state, the law was 
reasonable or necessary.139  
In Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis, the Court held a state law that 
retroactively stripped liability waiver clauses from mining contracts was constitutional.140  While 
the Court held that the law created a substantial impairment of contracts, that holding did not help 
the petitioners.141  It did not help because the Court again held that when reviewing a state law that 
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impairs a private contract, the Court is to give the legislature great deference.142  The Court gives 
the legislature deference by essentially applying a rational basis standard which means that private 
contracts can almost never win a challenge to state law under the Contract Clause.143  
Unsurprisingly, once the deference was given to the legislature, the Court held the state law was 
constitutional.144  
The next important Contract Clause the case the Court heard was General Motors Corporation 
v. Romein, a challenge by General Motors and Ford Motor Company to a Michigan statute passed 
in 1987 that repealed a 1981 statute.145  In Ford, the Court held that there were three steps to 
determine if there was substantial impairment of a contract by state law: (1) was there a contractual 
relationship; (2) did the law impair the contractual relationship; and, (3) was the impairment 
substantial.146   
Uniquely, the car companies in Ford argued that the 1981 statute had been integrated into the 
contract by default of the fact that the law was in effect when the contracts were executed.147  They 
argued that since the 1987 statute repealed the 1981 statue, and the 1981 statute was integrated 
into the contracts, the 1987 statute impaired the contracts by eliminating the effects of the 1981 
statute from the contracts.148  The Court rejected the argument, holding that not all state regulations 
that existed at the time the contracts were executed were incorporated into the contracts.149  The 
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Court held the only laws that were incorporated into the contracts were those that “affect[ed] the 
validity, construction and enforcement” of the contracts.150  The Court held that the 1981 statute 
was never a part of the contracts meaning that the contracts were not impaired by the 1987 
repeal.151   
F. Insurance Contracts and the Contact Clause 
 
A touchstone case of Contract Clause jurisprudence, W. B. Worthen Company v. Thomas is 
one of the only pure Contract Clauses cases to appear before the Supreme Court dealing with 
insurance policies impaired by a state law.152  Decided the same year as Blaisdell, the Court in W. 
B. Worthen heard a challenge to an Arkansas law that denied creditors of an individual the ability 
to claim a portion of the individual’s life insurance payout.153  The Court referenced its holding in 
Blaisdell and struck down the law as unconstitutional, differentiating the law in Blaisdell and the 
law in question.154  Specifically, the Court focused on the fact that the Arkansas law was unlimited 
in its time of applicability and was not passed to address an emergency.155   
Outside of the Supreme Court of the United States, the Eighth and Tenth Circuits have also 
addressed Contract Clause challenges to laws that affected insurance policies brought under the 
Contract Clause.156  In 1991, the Eighth Circuit heard Whirlpool Corp. v. Ritter, a case with facts 
nearly identical to that of Sveen.157  The court held that the law’s retroactive change of the life 
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insurance beneficiary after a divorce was “not insignificant.”158  The court opined that “one of the 
primary purposes of a life insurance contract is to provide for the financial needs of a person (or 
persons) designated by the insured” and that the law “effected a fundamental and pejorative change 
in the very essence of these contracts.”159 
Having found substantial impairment, the court in Ritter cited to both US Trust and Allied Steel 
and held that the law in question was “merely general, social legislation” and therefore must be 
examined to determine if it was reasonable.160  The court held that the law was not reasonable 
because it was being implemented retroactively to pursue what may or may not have been the 
insured’s actual intention.161  The court dismissed the argument that the ease of changing the 
beneficiary back should factor into the constitutionality of the law.162 
The holding in Ritter did not play a large role Sveen because of the Tenth Circuit’s holding in 
Stillman v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n Coll. Ret. Equities Fundi in 2003.163  The facts in 
Stillman strongly resemble the facts of both Sveen and Ritter with the only major difference being 
that the matter involved annuities and not life insurance.164  In Stillman, the court went out of its 
way to strike down the Contract Clause challenge and reject the holding in Ritter.165  The Stillman 
court held that there was no substantial impairment of a contractual right.166  Quoting extensively 
from the Joint Editorial Board of the Uniform Probate Code, the court held that contracts such as 
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the one in question are a “mixture of contract and donative transfer.”167  The court opined that the 
paying of the policy to a specified person was purely donative and therefore was not protected by 
the Contract Clause.168 
Having concluded that the Contract Clause was not applicable, the court went no further in its 
analysis.169  The court’s holding in Stillman never discussed if the law was reasonable or 
necessary.170  The Court in Sveen also heard the argument that life insurance contracts should be 
viewed as having a donative component that is separate from the contractaul component of a life 
insurance policy.171  The Court’s consideration of the argument suggests that it may have merit 
and may reappear in future Contract Clause cases.172   
III. The Supreme Court’s Holding in Sveen v. Melin 
 
Few observers were surprised when the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the matter of Sveen 
v. Melin in 2018.  While the case focused on Minnesota State Law § 524.2-804, subd.  1, at the 
time of certification, at least 26 other states had enacted similar laws.173  Additionally, the interest 
the Joint Editorial Board of the Uniform Probate Code showed in Stillman may have caught the 
attention of the Court.174  Regardless of the reason, the Court heard the case on March 19, 2018, 
and on June 11, 2018, the Supreme Court issued its holding in an opinion written by Justice 
Kagan.175  
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The majority set out by citing the Court’s holdings in Keystone and Allied Steel to reaffirm the 
Court’s long-standing precedent that the Contract Clause applies to all contracts.176  The Court 
then cited its holding in Simmons to reaffirm that not all laws “affecting pre-existing contracts 
violate the [Contract] Clause.”177  After which, the Court set out the factors that should be 
considered in determining if there was a substantial impairment of a contract.178  The Court held 
that “the extent to which the law undermines the contractual bargain, interferes with a party’s 
reasonable expectations, and prevents the party from safeguarding or reinstating his rights” should 
be considered in the analysis.179   
Having laid out the considerations, the Court held that Minnesota statute did not substantiality 
impair the life insurance contract.180  The Court reached this conclusion by holding that in many 
instances the law fulfills the intention of the insured, or at least the legislature thought so.181  An 
example of how the Court in Sveen showed great deference to the Minnesota legislature.182  The 
Court also stated that the insurance policy was essentially a will substitute and that the law has 
long allowed the revoking and altering of previously executed wills.183  The Court went on to opine 
that the law “no doubt” changed the contracts but that it was not impairing the contracts because 
many policyholders likely welcomed the change.184  
Shifting gears, the Court held that the law was unlikely to upset an insured’s expectations at 
the time they executed the policy.185  The Court opined that because at the time of execution, a 
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reasonable insured individual should have known that a divorce decree could affect the insurance 
policy, that the respondent should have expected the outcome the law demands or at least 
understood the possibility of it.186  The majority acknowledged that the Contract Clause applies 
only to legislation, but dismissed the acknowledgment as irrelevant because it did not alter the 
insured’s expectations.187  The Court noted it was unlikely that any married person purchasing life 
insurance contemplates divorce anyway.188 
The final reasoning presented by the majority for why there was no substantial impairment in 
Sveen was the ease at which an insured person could reverse the operations of the law.189  The 
Court pointed out that mailing in a change of beneficiary form was all that was required to have 
the divorced individual renamed as the beneficiary under the law.190  To support the holding, the 
Court cited to its holdings in Jackson, Curtis, Gilfillan, and Vance as examples of the Court 
upholding statutes in part because of the ease of compliance with the laws.191  The Court also 
repeated the argument made by the petitioners that the result of non-compliance with the 
Minnesota law was minimal when compared to the result of non-compliance with the laws in those 
cases.192  
The majority concluded its holding by dismissing the last point of the respondent’s 
argument.193  The Court rejected the argument that recording statutes do not act on the contract 
itself, while the Minnesota law acts on a contract by changing a term of the contract.194  The Court 
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summarized this as arguing for a separation between rights and remedies of contracts.195  The Court 
rejected this argument in part because it found that the recording statutes also act on the contracts, 
inserting mandatory action not found in the contract, and in part because both require little effort 
to “safeguard those benefits by taking an action.”196  To further bolster this conclusion, the Court 
also cited to its holding in Texaco.197  The Court pointed out that in Texaco, the Court specifically 
held that there was no legal significance between eliminating a right and a remedy under the 
Contract Clause.198  
Having reached the above conclusions, seven justices, along with Justice Kagan, held in favor 
of Mr. Sveen’s children, holding that the Minnesota law was constitutional because it did not 
substantially impair the insurance contract.199   
IV. Justice Gorsuch, the Lone Dissenter 
 
Justice Gorsuch wrote the lone dissent in Sveen v. Melin.200  The dissent started out by 
conceding that there is no dispute that when applied prospectively the Minnesota law is 
Constitutional.201  Then, the dissent continued its argument by examining the wording of the 
Contract Clause.202  Justice Gorsuch argued first that the wording of the Contract Clause is 
unambiguous and that it demands a complete ban on all state laws that impair the obligations of 
contracts.203  Noting, that the framers knew how to write the clause if they did not want it to result 
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in a complete bar.204  To buttress this view, the justice cited to the Court’s holding in Sturges.205  
Additionally, the justice, pointed to evidence from the ratification of the Constitution to support 
the contention that the Contract Clause was intended to be a complete bar and was known to be so 
at the time of ratification.206  
The dissent then proceeded to highlight the early precedent of the Court that addressed the 
Contract Clause and how it aligned with the unambiguous text of the Contract Clause.207  Justice 
Gorsuch identified the Court’s holdings in Green, Saunders, and more recently, the dissent of 
Justice Black in Simmons to support his view.208  Each case held, in the opinion of the dissent, that 
the modern interpretation of the Contract Clause is “hard to square with the Constitution’s original 
public meaning.”209 
The dissent also addressed the majority’s holding that the Minnesota law did not impair the 
life insurance contract.210  Justice Gorsuch began by agreeing with the majority that the choice of 
beneficiary is the “whole point” of a life insurance contract.211  The justice, however, argued that 
if the “whole point” of the contract was changed by state law, then there must be substantial 
impairment.212  The dissent cited to the Court’s holding in Woodward as support for this 
premise.213   
Attacking the legitimate purpose of the Minnesota law, Justice Gorsuch cited to an amicus 
brief filed in Hillman v. Maretta, on behalf of the United States Government, that argued that some 
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divorced persons intentionally keep their former spouses as the beneficiary for a variety of 
reasons.214  He also cited to other sources that suggest there are benefits to be gained by keeping a 
divorced spouse as the beneficiary when children are involved or when a person wishes matters to 
be handled more privately than a divorce proceeding.215 
With regard to the reasonableness of the impairment, the dissent started out by citing to the 
Court’s holdings in Allied Steel and US Trust to lay out the modern Contract Clause 
jurisprudence.216  Interestingly, and without comment as to why, Justice Gorsuch defined 
reasonableness as requiring that there was no more moderate way to accomplish the legislative 
intent, a standard similar to strict scrutiny and only found in modern Contract Clause jurisprudence 
when the state was a party to the contract being impaired.217  Perhaps Justice Gorsuch was 
accepting the argument put forth by the respondent that the Court should treat public and private 
contracts alike when applying the Contract Clause.218   
The justice then applied his version of the Allied Steel test to the facts and argued there was a 
substantial impairment of the life insurance contract.219  The justice found that not only were there 
theoretically less intrusive ways to accomplish the goal but that in some states the theoretical 
approaches had become reality.220  Justice Gorsuch also cited to the Amici Curiae for the Women’s 
Law Project et al. filed in Sveen v. Melin for support of this contention.221  
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The dissent then shifted gears to focus on the arguments made by the majority.222  Justice 
Gorsuch alleged that the majority was guilty of putting the carriage before the horse by considering 
factors of the reasonableness of the impairment to argue that there was no substantial 
impairment.223  The argument rests on the premise that the ease of reversing the effect of the law 
should not be considered as part of the standard for determining if there was substantial impairment 
created by the law.224  Additionally, the justice argued that the majority glossed over the “sizable 
(and maybe growing)” number of people affected by the law and who are not in favor of its 
result.225  Justice Gorsuch argued that part of the purpose of the Contract Clause was to protect all 
people who enter into contracts and that the majority betrayed that protection.226 
Accusing the majority of circular reasoning, the justice also took issue with the majority’s 
reasoning for why the law was reasonable.227  The dissent pointed out that the majority agreed with 
the Minnesota legislature that the law was necessary because the average insured person pays little 
attention to their beneficiary designation after getting divorced.228  The dissent also pointed out 
that the majority agreed with the petitioner that the insured individuals can reverse the effects of 
the law by paying attention to their beneficiary designation after getting divorced.229  Justice 
Gorsuch summarized this argument as “an apparent paradox.”230  
Concerning the reasonable expectations argument made by the majority, the dissent took issue 
with what he defined as treating courts and legislatures the same.231  The justice argued that a 
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major difference between courts and legislatures was that “[c]ourts may apply pre-existing laws” 
(emphasis his) while the legislatures passes new laws.232  The justice pointed to criminal law to 
provide the example that a court can only punish a person for violating a law that existed at the 
time it was broken and that legislatures can only pass laws that make future conduct illegal233 — 
a constitutional mandate found in the same article, section, and clause as the Contract Clause.234 
Lastly, the dissent challenged the majority’s interpretation of the cases the majority relied on 
to establish that retroactive laws have long been found constitutional by the Court.235  Justice 
Gorsuch charged that the Court’s holding in Blaisdell only supports retroactive legislation which 
alters “contractual remedies” (emphasis his).236  Therefore, the dissent argued, the case was 
inapplicable because the Minnesota law changes the obligation of who gets paid – not a remedy of 
how to enforce the payment.237  Justice Gorsuch again cited to the Court’s holding in Fletcher and 
Justice Black’s dissent Simmons to support his argument.238   
Justice Gorsuch also cited Lamphire, arguing that the recording statue the Court upheld did not 
affect an obligation but a remedy.239  The justice argued that while the law in Lamphire did prevent 
the first owner, who did not record his deed, from obtaining the rights to the land from the second 
owner, who did record his deed, nothing in the law prevented the first owner from bringing a claim 
against the person who sold the land twice to enforce the obligation.240  Therefor the value of the 
contract was never impaired by the law, just how the contract was enforced.241  The justice 
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concluded this line of reasoning by distinguishing Gilfillan because of its extraordinary 
circumstances.242  
Justice Gorsuch concluded his dissent by acknowledging that declaring state laws 
unconstitutional is a strong power and should not be lightly invoked.243  But even acknowledging 
that, he felt that the Minnesota law could not “survive an encounter even with the breeziest of 
Contract Clause tests.”244   
V. Words Have Meanings, Clauses Have Power, and Why the Holding in Sveen v. Melin Missed 
the Mark 
 
The Court’s holding in Sveen v. Melin was wrong for a number of reasons, all of which stem 
from how the modern Contract Clause jurisprudence has been stripped of almost all power and 
meaning.  The Contract Clause, which the Court has continually held to be unambiguous,245 and 
which the Court originally enforced as such,246 has now evolved into a moderate check on the 
states in some cases and dead letter law in others.247  It is time to embrace the dissents of Justice 
Sutherland in Blaisdell, Justice Black in Simmons and Justice Gorsuch in Sveen and return the 
Contract Clause to at least some of its original purpose.248  
A. The Status of the Contract Clause post Sveen v. Melin 
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The modern jurisprudence of the Contract Clause was reaffirmed by the Court’s holding in 
Sveen, at least for private contracts.249  The Court’s application of the Contract Clause made clear 
that challenges brought under the Contract Clause face a steep uphill battle just to prove substantial 
impairment.250  The Court held that the reasonable expectations of the parties to the contract, the 
purpose of the legislation that changed the contract, and the ease at which the change created by 
the law was reversible determined if the law substantially impaired the contract.251  The Court did 
not clarify if all three of the elements, or just one or two of them, was required for a law to have 
created a substantial impairment.252  The holding in Sveen also raised the bar satisfy any of the 
three elements, adding to the battles a challenger of the law faces.253 
In Sveen, the Court held that when examining a law to determine if it upset the reasonable 
expectations of the parties to the contract, the Court is to examine all laws in existence at the time 
of execution of the contract,254 the level of regulation in the field in which the contract existed at 
the time of execution,255 the powers courts had with respect to the contract at the time of the 
contract’s execution.256  The addition of the consideration of courts powers over the contract, at 
the time the contract was executed, makes this element nearly impossible for a challenger to 
satisfy.257   
The element that examines the purpose of the law that changed the contract is also unlikely 
to be satisfied by a challenger.  The Court reaffirmed in Sveen that great deference is given to 
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legislatures when evaluating a law that may impair private contracts.258  The practical effect of 
deference being given to the legislature, is to remove this element from the reach of a challenger.  
For example, in Sveen, evidence that some portion of divorced spouses opposed the effect of the 
law was not enough to overcome the Court’s deference to the legislature.259  
The third and final element that the Court used to determine if the law substantially 
impaired the insurance contract was how easily the effect of the law could be reversed by Mr. 
Sveen if he was disgruntled with its effect.260  As Justice Gorsuch argued in his dissent, the Court 
held that a law passed after the execution of a contract, that was passed because people did not pay 
attention to their life insurance policies was easily reversible because a person can pay attention to 
their life insurance policy and reverse the effect of the law.261  The Court essentially held as long 
as law’s effects are easily reversible on paper, the Court will uphold the law regardless of the 
reality of the situation.262  And of course, even if a challenger satisfied this, or all three elements 
laid out by the Court in Sveen, if the law was passed at a time of emergency and is designed to be 
short term and to counter the emergency then the law may still stand.263   
The modern jurisprudence of the Contract Clause for public contracts is very different than 
that for private contracts264 despite the fact that the Contract Clause itself makes no distinction 
between the two.265  Two significant differences between how public and private contracts are 
treated is: (1) that no deference is given to the state legislature when it impairs a public contract; 
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and, (2) state laws that create substantial impairment of public contracts must survive a test that 
strongly resembles strict scrutiny instead of rational basis.266  So while the two tests may appear 
identical, in reality they are worlds apart with public contracts receiving substantially more 
protection than private contracts.    
B. The Problems with Modern Contract Clause Jurisprudence 
 
When approaching a constitutional clause, and its jurisprudence, the first step is to 
determine the methodology that will be used to interpret the clause.267  There is substantial 
disagreement in law and academia over the proper way to interpret the Constitution.268  On one 
side, there are textualist and originalist who believe that the Constitution is a dead document and 
only consider the text of the Constitution and how it was understood at the time of its ratification.269  
On the other side there are those who believe the Constitution is a living document that other 
evidence should be considered besides the text and original meaning of the Constitution.270  What 
makes the modern jurisprudence of the Contract Clause concerning is that regardless of which 
view is used, the modern jurisprudence falls short of what the clause demands.  
i. The Textualist and Originalist Approach to the Contract Clause 
 
Textualists interpret the Constitution by examining only what is written in the Constitution 
and how the words in the Constitution were defined at the time it was written.271  Somewhat 
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similarly, originalist require the constitution be interpreted to mean what it was believed to have 
meant by those who ratified it.272  It is clear why these two theories often work hand in hand; the 
meaning of the words written, at the time they were written, likely molded what the people who 
voted to ratify the Constitution thought the clauses of the Constitution meant.273   
The first problem this methodology of constitution interpretation has with modern Contract 
Clause jurisprudence is that it is far removed from the original meaning and purpose of the Contract 
Clause.274  The Contract Clause, in its eleven short words, describes a bar on state laws which 
impair contracts.275  The early history of the ratification of the Contract Clause supports this view 
of the clause.276  Evidence from the constitutional debates about the Contract Clause, the similarity 
of the Contract Clause to that of an Ordinance in the Articles of Confederation, and the writings 
of Madison in The Federalist Number 44, make clear that the drafting committee was not intending 
to strongly limit the reach or scope of the clause.277 
Likewise, the early jurisprudence of the Contract Clause supports this understanding of the 
original intention of the clause.278  Fletcher, Woodward, Sturges, and Green are all early Supreme 
Court cases that held that the original understanding of the Contract Clause was to act as a complete 
ban on states impairing the obligations of contracts.279  It is telling that in the first case to truly 
limit the Court’s understanding of the application of the Contract Clause, Saunders, the Court held 
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that it was unsure of the ruling it was issuing and only restricted the clause to be applicable to laws 
that retroactively impair contracts.280 
ii. The Non-Textualist and Non-Originalist approach to the Contract Clause 
 
Even to those who dismiss, or who place less value on, the importance of interpreting the 
Constitution in a textualist or originalist fashion, there is little debate that the words of the 
Constitution must mean something.281  The non-textualist and non-originalist approach to 
constitutional interpretation considers multiple factors including the text, original meaning, 
legislative intent, modern understanding of the constitution and the effect of the Courts holding on 
the matter to form the meaning of the Constitution.282  Interpretation of the Constitution, when not 
done in originalist or textualist fashion, can require looking at the intent of words and applying it 
to modern times.283 
The purpose of the Contract Clause was to stop states from passing laws that impair 
contracts, particularly in a manner that allows a government to disfavor the contracts of a private 
citizens, and to allow the economy to function with the security of valid contracts.284  As explained 
in Part II, the purpose is known by the debates about the Contract Clause that lead to its insertion 
and eventual ratification as part of the United States Constitution.285  The concerns that lead to the 
inclusion of the Contract Clause in the Constitution are still very applicable today.  
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Protecting citizens from state government agendas that may disfavor them is still a very 
sought after goal,286 as is passing laws that allow the economy to function properly and for people 
to be able to trust in the validity and enforceability of their contracts in business.287  It follows that 
even if the Contract Clause is not to be construed absolutely, it should be interpreted as a clause to 
protect disfavored individuals from having states pass laws impairing the contracts they entered 
into before the law was passed except in exceptional cases.288 
It worth pausing to consider groups that contract within states and who benefit from the 
Constitution’s protection from the states being able to impair their contracts.  There is no dispute 
that some states pass laws with the intention of making it harder for unions to operate.289  Unions 
are a prime example of a group who may be disfavored by the state government290 and who may 
benefit from their contracts being protected against state laws.  It does not take a vivid imagination 
to contemplate a scenarios where states that disfavor unions could take advantage of the ability to 
impair contracts unions enter into after the contracts are executed.  Unions are just one example of 
a potentially disfavored group that benefits from the Contract Clause’s purpose of protecting 
contracts from state impairment.  
When applying this approach of constitutional interpretation to the Contract Clause, the 
modern jurisprudence of the Contract Clause comes up short.  As the Court’s holding in Sveen 
made clear, and Justice Gorsuch criticized in his dissent, the modern Contract Clause jurisprudence 
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favors laws that are favored by the state.291  Put a different way, the modern jurisprudence allows 
the majority in a state, through its legislature, to pass laws that impair the contracts of disfavored 
or less cared about individuals.292  In the case of Sveen, to impair the contracts of those who divorce 
amicably, or at least in a fashion where one spouse still wishes to provide for the other in the case 
of their passing.293   
Along with losing its purpose of protecting disfavored individual’s contracts, the modern 
jurisprudence is ignoring the equally valid economic protection purpose of the Contract Clause.294  
It is undisputed that contracts are an important element of the modern economy.295  But contracts 
are only useful when the terms written in them are believed to be enforceable and governing the 
exchange.296  The value of a contract is greatly diminished if at any time and for any “good” reason 
a state can pass a law that changes the terms of the contract.  While it is generally conceded that 
sometimes this practice of altering contracts by state law must be allowed, particularly when done 
to stop actions considered criminal or dangerous, at other times it is something that must be 
avoided to provide stability and faith to the market.297  The modern jurisprudence of the Contract 
Clause invites states to interfere with private contracts at their own leisure.298  As the Court pointed 
out in United States Trust Company of New York v.  New Jersey, a “governmental entity can always 
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find a use for extra money”.299  The risk of states impairing contracts with immunity concerned 
the framers of the Constitution and should equally concern the Court now.300  
Lastly, the treatment of the Contract Clause by the Court sets the precedent that full clauses 
of the Constitution can be ignored by the Court, or at the least, chipped away until they mean next 
to nothing.301  This is a precedent that should equally concern all citizens, regardless of their 
favored manner of interpreting the Constitution.302  While ignoring the Contract Clause is unlikely 
to provoke outrage from the general public, or even from most in the legal community, it is a 
dangerous precedent no less.303  
VI. Be Part of the Solution, Not the Problem; Fixing the Contract Clause Jurisprudence 
 
While it may seem tempting to return the Contract Clause to its original meaning, doing so 
would be equally unlikely and disastrous, even if proper.  Consider the number of state laws 
currently in existence.  Now consider how many of them impair some form of contract in one way 
or another.  While no exact answer can be given, it is safe to assume the answer is a lot.  If 
tomorrow, all of these laws’ constitutionality was questioned, the impact would be both large and 
negative.  This is essentially the argument made for stare decisis, to avoid overnight reversals of 
laws that create drastic changes by the courts.304  Instead, the Court should follow the suggestion 
of the respondent and the implication of Justice Gorsuch’s dissent, and change the standard of 
judging private contracts challenged under the Contract Clause to match the standard of judging 
public contracts challenged under the Contract Clause.305  
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The modern jurisprudence of the Contract Clause for challenges to state laws that impair 
public contracts is measurably stricter then challenges to private contracts.306  It eliminates the 
deference given to the state and requires the state to consider alternatives to impairing contracts 
when possible.307  The change would help realign the modern jurisprudence of the Contracts 
Clause with its original purpose.308  By losing the required deference standard, the courts would 
examine laws to see if they are passed by states to unfairly target certain private citizens, as 
originally intended.309  Similarly, the Court would also be able to examine state laws to be sure 
that they are not impairing citizen’s faith in their contracts as the Framers feared would occur.310 
And, perhaps most importantly, it would continue to give the Contract Clause actual meaning and 
not be essentially written out of the Constitution. 
The change would bring the modern Contract Clause back towards its original intent.  The 
Contract Clause was meant to favor the challengers of state laws, not to make state laws 
unquestionable.311  The modern jurisprudence pushes the high burden onto the challenger except 
in cases involving public contracts.312  If the Contract Clause is applied to private contracts as if 
they were public contracts, the Contract Clause would retain its use as a bar on the states except 
when laws are truly necessary for emergent reasons, limiting Blaisdell as Justice Black argued in 
his dissent in Simmons.313   
 
306 Compare United States Trust Company of New York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 27 (1977) (a public contract 
impairment matter) with Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982) (a private contract impairment matter).  
307 United States Trust Company of New York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 27 (1977). 
308 See supra Part II.  
309 THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 (James Madison). 
310 Id.; supra Far From a “Dead letter”, note 21. 
311 See supra Part II. 
312 Compare United States Trust Company of New York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 27 (1977) (a public contract 
impairment matter) with Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982) (a private contract impact matter). 
313 See Home Loan & Building Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934); El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 517 




The same can be said of how the shift would align more with a textual analysis of the 
Contract Clause.  The text of the Contract Clause is clear, states must not pass laws that impair 
contracts.314  Any interpretation that makes it harder for the state to pass these law is a step towards 
alignment with the text.315  It would also eliminate the distinction the Court created between private 
and public contracts, a distinction that has no support in the text.316   
Non-originalist and non-textualist methodologies of interpreting the Constitution will also 
find this shift in the application of the Contract Clause desirable.  By applying the modern public 
standard to private contracts, there would still be nothing preventing states from passing laws that 
impair contracts in times of emergency.317  What would be prevented is states passing laws that 
retroactively change contracts for any reason other than serious need.318  This interpretation 
protects contracts that may become disfavored by a state for any reason and the economy.  What 
this interpretation does not do is stop states from passing laws that are necessary to protect a state 
or its citizens.319   
Interpretations of the Constitution almost always disfavors absolutes.320  In fact, the Court’s 
precedents in freedom of speech cases make clear that no right is absolute, regardless of what a 
textualist, originalist, or any other interpretative methodology may find the right to demand.321  
Treating all laws challenged under the Contract Clause as if they are impairing public contract is 
a realistic approach because it protects disfavored groups within a state, protects the economies 
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faith in contracts, and protects the legitimacy of all clauses in the Constitution, without imposing 
an absolute bar that the court’s avoid.322   
While perhaps not ideal for any one methodology of constitutional interpretation, the 
proposed interpretation of the Contract Clause represents a modest approach to realigning the 
jurisprudence of the clause with it original purpose while remaining workable in modern times.  It 
strikes a position in the middle of the extremes of the Court’s holdings in Fletcher and Simmons.323  
By taking this modest approach at reforming the jurisprudence, the proposed interpretation 
presents a realistic opportunity to implement an interpretation of the Contract Clause that most can 
accept.  
VII. Stare Excusis324* and the Argument Against Changing the Contract Clause 
 
The strongest argument against the proposed interpretation of the Contract Clause is stare 
decisis.  Stare decisis is a legal theory that the Supreme Court should abide by its earlier 
decisions.325  The purpose of the theory is to ”promote[] stability, protect[] reliance 
interests, constrain[] judicial discretion, and reduce[] the decision costs of resolving constitutional 
cases.”326  It is generally agreed upon that stare decisis is an important theory in all methodologies 
of constitutional interpretation.327 
 
322 Home Loan & Building Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (the Court made clear that the Great 
Depression was a major factor in why the state law was allowed to impair the mortgage contracts).  
323 Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 88 (1810); El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965).  
324 Interview with Seth Essendrop, Associate Editor, Seton Hall Law Review, in Newark, NJ. (Jan 9, 2019) (a term 
coined by Seth Essendrop to describe the phenomenon of courts using or disregarding stare decisis to support already 
held beliefs).   
* Interview with Clare Brogan, in Morristown, NJ. (Jan 10, 2019) (stare excusatis is the proper Latin translation for 
the phrase let the excuses stand).   







The theory of stare decisis argues that the Supreme Court should be extremely hesitant in 
changing its current jurisprudence of the Contract Clause.328  It argues that the lower courts, and 
all citizens, are depending on the current interpretation of the clause being consistently applied in 
cases across the country.329  
The argument for stare decisis is less persuasive, however, when viewed in the context of the 
history of the Contract Clause.  As examined in Part II, the Court’s interpretation of the Contract 
Clause has changed multiple times during the last two centuries.330  Every one of these changes 
represents an example of the Court straying from the theory of stare decisis.331  Admittedly some 
of the changes have been minor, but others have also been large and strongly push against the legal 
theory.332   
It is also relevant that the current jurisprudence of the Contract Clause is less than a year old.333  
The argument of stare decisis strengthens with time, which means it is currently at its weakest 
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from the 1970s.335  Even so, the jurisprudence of the clause being relied on is relatively small when 
considering the lifespan of the Contract Clause.336 
When all of these arguments against the theory of stare decisis are aggregated, they create a 
fair rebuttal.  Stare Decisis is an important element of this country’s legal framework,337 but it can 
also be used as an excuse to avoid necessary change.  Reformation of the Contract Clause should 
not be prevented because of stare decisis.  
Another argument that could be made against the implementation of the proposed 
interpretation of the Contract Clause is that will be too restrictive on the states, an argument that 
has been made since its inclusion in the Constitution.338  As discussed above, this argument is 
unpersuasive because even strict textualist disfavors absolute interpretations of the Constitution.339  
The proposed interpretation maintains flexibly because it is not calling for Blaisdell to be overruled 
and therefore maintaining the theory that states can impair contracts during emergencies if done 
in a reasonable manner.340  
Strict Originalist are also likely to take issue with the proposed interpretation not over 
Blaisdell.341  The argument is that Contract Clause was known during the ratification period to be 
an inconvenience on states, specifically in their ability to respond to emergencies.342  For this 
reason they will oppose any interpretation that does not enforce the same strict liability upon the 
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states.343  As argued above, while this view may please strict originalist, the Court disfavors 
absolutes and it is unlikely to believe they will accept any proposed interpretation that demands an 
absolute bar.344  So while the proposed interpretation may not go far enough for a strict originalist, 
it is likely their best shot at a step towards their preferred interpretation of the Contract Clause.  
The proposed interpretation of the Contract Clause may not be perfect.  It may present stare 
decisis concerns345 and is unlikely to please any one particular view of constitutional 
interpretation.346  The Court should adopt the proposed interpretation of the Contract Clause 
anyway because the current status of Contract Clause jurisprudence is unacceptable347, the benefits 
of the proposed interpretation warrant the change348, and because stare decisis should not force 
bad law to be addressable.  
VIII. How the Court Should Have Held in Sveen v. Melin 
 
Had the Court relied on the proposed interpretation of the Contract Clause, its holding in 
Sveen would have looked a lot more like the argument of the Justice Gorsuch’s dissent.  There are 
two major differences that would have taken place in the analysis of the Minnesota law: (1) a shift 
in the likelihood of finding an impairment in favor of Ms. Melin; and, (2) the removal of deference 
to the Minnesota legislature.  
Starting with the shift in finding an impairment, the proposed interpretation would have 
required the Court to examine the law under the standard it has applied to public contracts.349  The 
Court’s holding in US Trust made clear that the Court favored finding impairments in Contract 
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Clause challenges involving public contracts.350  While it is impossible to accurately predict how 
the Court would have held, the Court’s history of finding impairments of public contracts and the 
fact the Court in Sveen found a “change” of the contract makes it more likely than not that an 
impairment would have been found.351 
If the Court had found an impairment, it is very likely that the law would have been held 
to be unconstitutional under the proposed interpretation.  The proposed interpretation would have 
required the Court to give no deference to the Minnesota legislature regarding the necessity of the 
law.352  More so, the interpretation would have applied a standard similar to strict scrutiny.353  It 
would have required the Court to examine if there were less intrusive methods to accomplish its 
goal.354  As the dissent by Justice Gorsuch pointed out, there are actually implemented laws that 
accomplish the goal of assisting divorced spouses to address their life insurance policies that do 
not impair insurance contracts in multiple states.355  The existence of alternatives would have 
required the Court to hold that the Minnesota law violated the Contract Clause of the Constitution. 
IX. Conclusion 
 
The Supreme Court must reverse the course of its precedent with regards to the Contract Clause 
of the United States Constitution.  The current jurisprudence of the clause is unsatisfactory 
regardless of which method of constitutional interpretation is employed.  The ideal solution is to 
enforce the Contract Clause against private contracts in the same manner in which the Court 
currently enforces it against public contracts.  This realignment of the Contract Clause is supported 
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by all interpretative methods of the Constitution and likely would have led to a reversal of the 
Court’s holding in Sveen v. Melin. 
